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Right to a Jury Trial for Legal Claims:
Does the Equitable Cleanup Doctrine
Make Sense in Missouri?
State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherryl
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to a jury trial is older than the Constitution, the Articles of
Confederation, and even the settlement of America. 2 The long held tradition
makes it difficult to imagine that the presence of an equitable claim could
undermine a litigant's entitlement to have his claims heard by a jury of his
peers. Yet that is precisely what the equitable cleanup doctrine allows state
courts to do. 3 Until recently, the cases decided by the Missouri Supreme
Court adhered to the equitable cleanup doctrine, denying jury trials for mixed
claims of law and equity.
4
In Leonardi, the Missouri Supreme Court changed the equitable cleanup
doctrine by enlarging litigants' right to a jury trial. 5 After Leonardi, a claim-
ant does not automatically lose her right to a jury trial because of a single
equitable claim.6 The Leonardi court correctly decided that equitable cleanup
is inefficient, inflexible, and disrespects the long history of jury trial prefer-
ence.7 While the Leonardi decision is good judicial policy, it does not provide
much guidance for lower courts.
1. 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
2. See Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 347, 353 (2003) ("[T]rial[s first] began developing after the Norman
Conquest of 1066.").
3. Before the merger of law and equity, courts in England recognized a distinc-
tion between the two court systems. Id. at 356-57. Because full justice could not al-
ways be achieved in one court, the equitable cleanup doctrine developed allowing a
court sitting in equity to award legal remedies as well as equitable remedies. Id. at
360. Missouri recognized this doctrine, allowing a court, once equitable jurisdiction
attached, to resolve any claim for legal relief without the aid of a jury. See JEFFREY A.
BURNS, MO. PRAC.: METHODS OF PRACTICE § 10.1, at 344 (2002).
4. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 472-73.
5. See id. at 473.
6. Id. at 474.
7. Id. at 473-74.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Radiant Research, Inc. ("Radiant") contracted with pharmaceutical
companies to oversee the testing of new drugs on human subjects.8 In turn,
Radiant entered into a consulting agreement with Dr. Craig L. Leonardi and
Craig L. Leonardi, P.C., (collectively, "Leonardi") to carry out some of the
trials using the new drugs. 9 The agreement between Leonardi and Radiant
consisted of restrictive covenants prohibiting Leonardi from performing any
tests for the pharmaceutical companies unless Radiant served as an interme-
diary.' 0 In November 2001, Leonardi terminated its relationship with Radiant,
but in violation of the contract, it continued to conduct tests for the pharma-
ceutical companies without using Radiant as an intermediary." As a result of
the breach, Radiant filed suit seeking both injunctive relief to enforce the
restrictive covenants and damages for breach of contract, anticipatory repu-
diation, and tortious interference with contract.' 2 Leonardi responded with
counterclaims and affirmative defenses. 13
On the trial court's own motion, a preliminary injunction hearing was
held.' 4 The lower court denied the preliminary injunction for several reasons:
it was not certain that the restrictive covenant was enforceable, Radiant was
not able to show a strong possibility of probable harm,' 5 and an injunction
would have a negative impact on patients and medical research.' 6 As further
support, the lower court noted that injunctive relief should only be granted if
there is no adequate remedy at law.17 Because Radiant could receive damages
for the breach of contract, the trial court held that a preliminary injunction
was not appropriate.' 8 Leonardi then voluntarily dismissed its equitable





13. Id. Leonardi's affirmative defenses included laches, estoppel, and unclean
hands, and its legal claims alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and an equitable request for a declaratory judgment. Id.
14. State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, No. ED 82789, 2003 WL 21384384, at *1
(Mo. Ct. App. June 17, 2003) ("Leonardi F'), transferred to 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo.
2004) (en banc).
15. Id.
16. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 464. The St. Louis County Circuit Judge, the Hon-
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claims, 19 but the trial court held that Leonardi was not entitled to a jury trial
because Radiant still had an equitable claim before the court.20
After the trial court denied Leonardi's request for a jury trial, Leonardi
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Eastern District. 2' The appellate court issued a writ prohibiting the
trial court from commencing further action in the case.22 Leonardi claimed it
was denied its constitutional right to a jury trial because it had brought a
claim for damages and the equitable cleanup doctrine should therefore not
apply.
23
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held that there
was no current equitable claim for which the trial court had equitable jurisdic-
24 2tion. Citing State ex rel. Estill v. Iannone,25 the appellate court held that
without a prayer for an equitable remedy like specific performance, the trial
court should not have denied a jury trial.26 The court made absolute the writ
prohibiting the trial court from denying Leonardi a jury trial. 27 Radiant's mo-
tion for transfer was then granted by the Missouri Supreme Court.28 The su-
preme court affirmed, holding that when a party asserts an equitable claim,
the equitable claim does not alone justify a denial of a request for a jury trial
on all claims if the party asserts legal claims that are not merely incidental to
the equitable claims. 29 In doing so, the Missouri Supreme Court broadened
the right to a jury trial, abrogating past precedent and declaring a new stan-
dard for Missouri's circuit courts to consider when a proceeding involves
both legal and equitable relief.
30
19. Id.
20. Id. at 465. The equitable claim remained because denial of the preliminary
injunction did not mean a permanent injunction would not be available and the equi-




24. State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, No. ED 82789, 2003 WL 21384384, at *2
(Mo. Ct. App. June 17, 2003) (The court concluded that there was no indication that
the equitable claim brought would result in a grant of equitable relief because the
preliminary injunction was denied, suggesting that the equitable claim was not sup-
ported by the evidence.), transferred to 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
25. 687 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (granting prohibition when the
right to a jury trial is improperly denied by the lower court).
26. Leonardi 1, 2003 WL 21384384 at *2.
27. Id. at *3.
28. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
29. Id. at 474. On transfer, the court denied Radiant's request for a preliminary
injunction and made the appellate court's writ prohibiting the trial court from denying
Leonardi a jury trial without granting relief on an equitable claim absolute as modi-
fied by the supreme court's opinion. Id.
30. Id. at 473. The court said that the trial court has the discretion to try cases in
the "most practical and efficient manner possible" while giving deference to the his-
2005]
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background
Although this Note is primarily concerned with Missouri law, it is nec-
essary to outline the basic framework of the American court system and the
court system upon which it is modeled. Because the "dichotomy of separate
jurisdiction" evolved from old England's separation of legal and equitable
courts,31 a summary of the historical background is helpful.
1. The English Court System
The original English courts made "no distinction between law and eq-
uity."3 2 England developed equity courts during the fourteenth century as a
result of inadequacies in the common law court system. 33 As a result, courts
of law and equity were separate, often requiring parties to file multiple suits
to resolve all claims resulting from a single transaction.
34
Despite their formal separation, interaction between the courts at law
and equity was occasionally necessary. 35 That interaction eventually gave rise
to concurrent jurisdiction of equity and law.36 If the parties' primary rights
were legal, those parties were entitled to litigate their claims in a court of law
and receive the remedies available in that court for wrongs committed by the
opposing party.37 However, legal remedies were not always sufficient to pro-
torical preference to a jury trial. Id. Therefore, "[u]nless circumstances demand oth-
erwise," the trial court should allow claims at law to be tried by jury while leaving the
equitable claims to be tried by the court. Id.
31. Id. at 468.
32. Sward, supra note 2, at 356.
33. Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1179 (1961);
see, e.g., JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 16 (5th
ed. 1941) ("The frequent occurrence of cases in which the rules of the law produced
manifest injustice ... and the unwillingness of the common-law judges to allow any
modification of the doctrines ... furnished both the occasion and the necessity for
another tribunal, which should adopt different methods and exhibit different tenden-
cies."); Sward, supra note 2, at 356-57. The common law writ system required all
claims to fall within a limited number of writs. Id. at 357. Because the chancery was
reluctant to issue new writs to cover all claims, some could not obtain justice in the
common law courts. Id.
34. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.6, at
16-17 (3d ed. 1985).
35. Sward, supra note 2, at 360. For example, if an equity court hearing a con-
tract case found fraud in the inducement, it could enjoin courts at law from trying a
case on the provisions of the contract. Id. An equity court could also enjoin proceed-
ings at law that were "duplicitous." Id.
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vide complete justice so equity courts had "the power to interfere and to
award .... remedies which [were] of the same general kind as those granted
by the courts of law to the same litigant parties under the same circum-
stances. ' 38 Thus, if the remedies at law were inadequate, an equity court us-
ing the equitable cleanup doctrine could award both equitable and legal
remedies if the legal claim was incidental to the equitable claim.39 The
cleanup doctrine eliminated the multiplicity of actions that would otherwise
occur if equity dismissed the suit and required the remaining claims to be
tried at law.40 An equity court also had the power to enjoin proceedings at law
that were "duplicitous" or nullified because of an equitable judgment.4 I
Even though equity courts had the power to act within the legal court's
jurisdiction if the circumstances warranted, the legal courts had no similar
42power. Courts at law could neither interfere with matters before the equity
courts nor hear equitable matters. 43 The concurrent jurisdiction and the lack
of reciprocity were important for two reasons. First, concurrent jurisdiction
demonstrated that even when law and equity courts were separate, they were
complementary." Second, the cleanup doctrine illustrated equity's power
over courts at law, but those powers were not reciprocal.4 5
By the nineteenth century, England began to merge the courts at law and
46equity. But even though the courts merged, "little consideration was given
to harmonizing rights recognized 'at law' with those 'in equity,' so that ... it
was appropriate to speak of 'legal' and 'equitable' rights as though they were
two different though concurrent bodies. ' ' 7 Therefore, remnants of the dual
system lingered.
2. Right to a Jury Trial
Just like the law and equity court dichotomy, the jury trial can also be
traced back to England. The most prominent distinction between law and
equity was the absence of a right to a jury trial in equity. This distinction re-
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also Note, supra note 33, at 1181-82.
40. Note, supra note 33, at 1181-82.
41. Sward, supra note 2, at 360.
42. Id. at 360-61. Circumstances warranting intervention included unavailability
of an adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm to the petitioner if the equity court
did not intervene. Id. at 360. Irreparable harm included multiple proceedings arising
out the same transaction. Id. It is still true today that if there is an adequate remedy
available at law, one cannot have an equitable remedy. DAN B. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW
OF REMEDIES § 2.2(1) (2nd ed. 1993).
43. Sward, supra note 2, at 360-61.
44. Id. at 361.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 358.
47. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 34, § 1.4, at 13.
2005]
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mained even after the law and equity court systems merged.48 The evolved
practice of selecting twelve impartial jurors with no prior personal knowledge
of the facts before them to determine the issues of fact in courts at law be-
came a fundamental element of American jurisprudence. 49 The right to a trial
by jury is guaranteed by both the United States Constitution50 and the Mis-
souri Constitution.
5 1
However, the guarantee of a jury trial has not typically applied to equi-
table claims. 52 The reasons for denying a jury trial in equity are not altogether
clear. "At no time in history was the line dividing equity from law alto-
gether--or even largely-the product of a rational choice between issues
which were better suited to court or to jury trial. 53 Moreover, there is little
indication that the chancellor's initial selection of a trial without a jury re-
flected a considered rejection of a jury trial.54 Regardless of the reasoning
behind it, most states, including Missouri prior to Leonardi, have denied a
jury trial for claims seeking equitable relief.
55
Adoption of the equitable cleanup doctrine complicates the lack of a
right to a jury trial for an equitable claim. An equity court could historically
obtain jurisdiction over a legal claim even if it were merely incidental to a
request for equitable relief.56 Once it was determined which court had juris-
diction, the corresponding type of trial would be held, i.e. a jury trial for
courts sitting at law and a bench trial for a court sitting in equity.5 7 As a gen-
48. Sward, supra note 2, at 356. Although the origins of the absence of jury trials
in equity courts are somewhat unclear, some influential factors include jurors' inabil-
ity to understand complex instruments involved in equity, the chancellor's tendency
to regard himself as an administrator and not a judge, and the court's probable con-
cem with resolving common law trial problems over providing jury trials in its sepa-
rate legal establishment. Note, supra note 33, at 1180-81.
49. Sward, supra note 2, at 355-56.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment does not guarantee trial
by jury in the state courts. See Hammons v. Ehney, 924 S.W.2d 843, 848 n.3 (Mo.
1996) (en banc).
51. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a) ("[t]he right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed
shall remain inviolate ... ").
52. See generally Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); see
also JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 34, § 8.2.
53. Id. at § 8.2, at 417.
54. Id.
55. See State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 84-86 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc) (applying a historical standard to determine whether a jury trial would have
been available for an equitable claim at the time the constitutional provision was
adopted).
56. Note, supra note 33, at 1181.
57. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 34, § 8.4.
[Vol. 70
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eral rule, once equity obtained jurisdiction, it retained it unless the facts relied
on to sustain the equity jurisdiction failed. 8
B. Availability of a Jury Trial for an Equitable Claim
in the Federal Court System
An alternative to delving into the intricacies of classifying claims as in-
cidentally or primarily equitable is separation of claims for the purpose of
determining whether a litigant may request a jury trial. 59 This view has been
adopted in the federal court system.60 Under this view, equitable and legal
claims asserted in one action may be separated because "there is a right to
jury trial on the legal claims which must not be infringed either by trying the
legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a court trial of a common
issue existing between the claims." 6'
The basis for development of this alternative again has its origin in Eng-
lish common law.62 Prior to the merger of courts of law and equity, difficulty
and inefficiency gave rise to the development of the equitable cleanup doc-
trine. 63 If legal issues were subordinate to equitable issues, the doctrine al-
lowed an equity court to invoke jurisdiction over the entire case. 64 The mere
existence of legal issues did not give litigants a right to a jury trial.65 Even
though the use of the equitable cleanup doctrine originated as a result of a
dichotomous court system, it continued in the federal courts for over twenty
years after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged the courts of law and
equity.
6 6
After merger, the grounds for the continued use of the equitable cleanup
67doctrine are not as persuasive. As the Supreme Court began to disfavor theuse of the equitable cleanup doctrine, the Court changed the way it looked at
58. Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 325 (1886). See POMEROY, supra note 33, §
237(d).
59. Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Merged Procedures, 65 HARV. L. REv.
453, 457 (1952).
60. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-71 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500, 508 (1959).
61. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538.
62. See John E. Sanchez, Jury Trials in Hybrid and Non-hybrid Actions: The
Equitable Clean-up Doctrine in the Guise of Inseparability and Other Analytical
Problems, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 638-40 (1989).
63. Id. at 641-42.
64. A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation,
100 U. PA. L. REv. 320, 320 (1951-52); Sanchez, supra note 62, at 642.
65. Sanchez, supra note 62, at 642.
66. Id.
67. See Levin, supra note 64, at 322-26.
2005)
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68 6
the right to a jury trial. In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,6 9 the Supreme
Court eliminated judges' discretion to determine whether the parties were
entitled to a jury trial. 70 The Beacon Theatres Court held that the right to a
jury trial depended solely on the existence of an adequate legal remedy.7 The
Court concluded that legal claims should be tried first, preserving a litigant's
72
right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court further affirmed its preference that
legal claims be tried by a jury in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.73 In Dairy
Queen, the Court held that litigants are entitled to a jury trial on their legal
claims, even if those claims are incidental to equitable claims.74 Finally, in
Ross v. Bernhard," the Supreme Court held that any legal component of an
otherwise equitable claim must be separated out and the factual issues tried
by jury.
76
C. Availability of a Jury Trial for an Equitable Claim in Missouri
The first constitution enacted in the state of Missouri established a dual
court system, one to deal with legal claims and another distinct set of courts
with equitable powers. 77 The dichotomy was abandoned within a decade of its
establishment. 78 Subsequently, Missouri courts have tried both legal and equi-
table claims in the same court. Since abolishing the dual court system, Mis-
souri courts have dealt with the right to a jury trial dilemma in a somewhat
inconsistent manner. 79 While some cases hold that a court may retain jurisdic-
68. Sanchez, supra note 62, at 644.
69. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
70. Id. at 506-08.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 510-11 ("[O]nly under the most imperative circumstances ... can the
right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable
claims.").
73. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
74. Id. at 470.
75. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
76. Id. at 537-38.
77. Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. V §§ 1, 10 ("The judicial power as to matters of
law and equity, shall be vested in a 'supreme court,' in a 'chancellor,' in 'circuit
courts' .... ; "The court of chancery shall have original and appellate jurisdiction in
all matters of equity .... ").
78. Mo. CONST. of 1820, amend. 1, 2 (abolishing the office of chancellor and
relegating equity jurisdiction to the supreme court and circuit courts.).
79. Compare Rockhill Tennis Club of Kansas City v. Volker, 56 S.W.2d 9 (Mo.
1932), abrogated by State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en
banc), with Jaycox v. Brune, 434 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1968), abrogated by Leonardi,
137 S.W.3d 462, and Krummenacher v. W. Auto Supply Co., 217 S.W.2d 473 (Mo.
1949) (en banc), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
[Vol. 70
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tion over an entire case even when an equitable award is not appropriate, 80
others hold that a court sitting in equity does not have jurisdiction to enter
judgment on legal issues if no equitable right has been violated.8 '
In Rockhill Tennis Club of Kansas City v. Volker,82 owners of a tennis
club sought to enforce a purchase option in a lease.8 3 Although the court re-
fused to enforce the lease on public interest grounds, the tennis club was not
precluded from recovering damages.84 Even though the tennis club owners
sought equitable remedies, the court reasoned that a traditionally legal rem-
edy could be awarded because once equity is given jurisdiction over a case,
that jurisdiction should not be relinquished "short of doing complete justice,"
which may include an award for damages.
85
In Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co.,86 the plaintiffs sought
equitable relief and damages resulting from the same occurrence of nui-
sance. 87 The trial judge denied equitable relief but awarded monetary dam-
ages resulting from the nuisance.8 8 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that the lower court sitting in equity did not have the authority to render
a judgment on plaintiff's claims at law because the plaintiff was not found to
be entitled to equitable relief 8 9 As a result, the equitable claim would need to
be determined by the court without a jury and the claim for damages must, if
the defendant so demands, be determined by a jury.
In Burnett v. Johnson,90 the plaintiffs claimed damages from breach of
contract.9 ' The defendants responded by asserting an equitable defense, an
equitable claim, and a legal claim.92 The plaintiff objected to the entire suit
being tried in equity, without a right to a jury, but the trial court held that
defendant's equitable counterclaims converted the case from a case at law to
a case in equity. 93 After hearing the evidence, the court found for the defen-
dant on his damage claims but denied equitable relief and found against plain-
80. See, e.g., Rockhill Tennis Club, 56 S.W.2d at 20; Real Estate Say. Inst. v.
Collonius, 63 Mo. 290 (Mo. 1876).
81. See, e.g., Krummenacher, 217 S.W.2d at 475.
82. 56 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1932), abrogated by State ex reL Leonardi v. Sherry, 137
S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id. at 20.
85. Id.
86. 217 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1949) (en banc), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d
462.
87. Id. at 473.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 475.
90. 349 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1961), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
91. Id. at 20.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 21-22.
2005]
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tiff on his claim for damages. 94 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court found
that the case was properly within equitable jurisdiction originally,95 but that
the cleanup doctrine "applies as a general rule only when the court retains the
original case in order to grant some substantial equitable relief.' 96 Since the
equitable claims failed in this case, the litigants were entitled to have their
legal claims tried by jury.97 Again, the duplicity of claims might require a
court to separately determine their merit, dividing those at law and those in
equity.
In Jaycox v. Brune,9 s the plaintiff sued on two alternative counts, the
first to enforce an oral contract to make a will in plaintiff's favor and the sec-
ond to recover damages for services rendered.99 The court dismissed the equi-
table claim and found for the defendant on the legal claim after a bench
trial. °00 The court characterized the general rule to require that "equity juris-
diction must first attach both under the pleadings and the proof' before a jury
trial could be denied on a legal claim.10' Since the trial court had found no
equity in the counts requesting enforcement of the contract, and the remaining
count was purely legal, the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial.
2
In Willman v. Beheler,10 3 plaintiff sued defendant requesting enforce-
ment of a restrictive covenant, and defendant counterclaimed for damages.1
0 4
The lower court, in a trial without a jury, entered judgment for defendant on
plaintiffs petition and against defendant on his counterclaim. 0 5 On appeal,
the Missouri Supreme Court found that enforcing the restrictive covenant
nearly five years later would not be sufficient relief.106 However, the court
found that the equity court could award monetary damages on the equitable
claim.' 0 7 The case was remanded for the lower court to determine the dam-
ages caused to the plaintiff by the defendant's violation of the covenant.'
0 8
94. Id.
95. Id. at 23.
96. Id.
97. Id. The plaintiffs request for a jury trial was not properly asserted at the trial
court below, therefore it was not preserved for appeal. Id. at 24.
98. 434 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1968), abrogated by State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry,
137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
99. Id. at 54 1.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 543.
102. Id.
103. 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973) (en banc) ("Willman 1"), abrogated by State ex
rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
104. Id. at 773.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 778.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 778-79.
[Vol. 70
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On remand in State ex rel. Willman v. Sloan,10 9 the trial court granted the
original defendant's request for a jury trial on the claim for damages.' 10 The
original plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the jury from being
impaneled."' The defendant argued that the only issue on remand was the
amount of damages caused, an issue at law requiring a jury trial. 1 2 The Su-
preme Court of Missouri held that the issue was equitable, relying on its
Willman I finding that the plaintiff's claim was enforceable in equity despite
the fact that monetary damages were the appropriate remedy."13
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Decision
In State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry,"14 the Missouri Supreme Court held
that Leonardi could not be denied a jury trial on his legal claims simply
because Radiant requested an injunction, which is an equitable remedy." 5
To arrive at this decision, the court reviewed Missouri's "inconsistent and
confusing" law. 16 In reexamining the holdings in Jaycox,117 Burnett,"'
Krummenacher, 19 Rockhill Tennis Club,120 Willman 1,121 and Willman 11,122
109. 574 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) ("Willman I'), abrogated by State ex
rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
110. Id. at 422. The respondent in Willman II, the Honorable Charles H. Sloan,
was the judge at the trial level who granted the request for a jury trial. Id. at 421-22.
111. Id. at 422.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 423.
114. 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
115. Id. at 474.
116. Id. at 465.
117. Jaycox v. Brune, 434 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. 1968) (holding that an equitable
court is without jurisdiction to dispose of the entire claim if the equitable claim fails),
abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
118. Burnett v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 19, 23-24 (Mo. 1961) (despite finding that if
equitable claims were unsuccessful the claims at law should have been tried before a
jury, the court held that the plaintiffs had waived their right to a jury trial), abrogated
by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
119. Krummenacher v. W. Auto Supply Co., 217 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Mo. 1949) (en
banc) (holding that in absence of an equitable right, the equitable court does not have
jurisdiction to hear legal claims), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
120. Rockhill Tennis Club of Kansas City v. Volker, 56 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1932)
(holding that if a court was unable to grant equitable relief, the court, should retain
jurisdiction to award legal damages), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
121. Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770, 778-79 (Mo. 1973) (en banc) (holding
that a court in equity can award a legal remedy despite the failure of an equitable
remedy), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
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the court found that this entire line of precedent failed to account for the
historical preference given to jury trials and the consolidation of legal and
equitable jurisdiction.' 23
Precedent, found the court, tended to fall within two principal catego-
ries.' 24 The first category of holdings' 25 stated that once a court of equity
acquired jurisdiction, the court could retain jurisdiction in order to provide
the parties with complete justice, especially if the court were considering a
prayer for general relief.126 The court distinguished that line of cases from
the second category which asserted that if a court sitting in equity did not
award equitable relief, the court did not have jurisdiction to render judg-
ment on the legal issues before it.127 The majority concluded that the results
of applying the two principles in recent cases were "mixed.,'
28
The court specifically examined several decisions. 129 In Rockhill Tennis
Club,130 the supreme court instructed the trial court to hold a hearing without
a jury for damages, a legal remedy, despite the fact that no equitable remedies
were appropriate.' 31 Similarly, in Willman 1132 and Willman 11,133 the court
122. State ex rel. Willman v. Sloan, 574 S.W.2d 421, 422-23 (Mo. 1978) (en
bane) (holding that when the facts sustaining equitable jurisdiction fail, the equity
court does not have jurisdiction to award damages at law), abrogated by Leonardi,
137 S.W.3d 462.
123. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 468.
124. Id. at 465-66.
125. Specifically cited by the court in support of this proposition was State ex rel.
Drey v. Hoester, 608 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Mo. 1980) (en bane) ("Once having acquired
jurisdiction equity will retain it, under a prayer for general relief .... to administer
full and complete justice."). See, e.g., Deutsch v. Wolff, 994 S.W.2d 561, 567 (Mo.
1999) (en bane) (retaining jurisdiction on both an equitable and legal claim in order to
avoid inconsistent judgments and "afford complete justice"); Metro. St. Louis Sewer
Dist. v. Zykan, 495 S.W.2d 643, 658 (Mo. 1973) (en bane) (finding that an equitable
court can retain jurisdiction in order to provide full justice especially if there is a
general prayer for relief); Townsend v. Maplewood Inv. & Loan Co., 173 S.W.2d
911, 914 (Mo. 1943) (holding that equitable courts may retain jurisdiction once in-
voked in order to provide complete relief).
126. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 465.
127. Id. at 465-66. See, e.g., Willman II, 574 S.W.2d at 422-23; Jaycox v. Brune,
434 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. 1968), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462; Krum-
menacher v. W. Auto Supply Co., 217 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Mo. 1949), abrogated by
Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
128. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 466.
129. For further discussion of facts and reasoning behind the cases examined, see
supra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
130. Rockhill Tennis Club of Kansas City v. Volker, 56 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1932),
abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
131. Id. at 20-21.
132. Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973) (en bane), abrogated by
Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
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allowed the parties to proceed in equity even though damages were to be
awarded. 134 The Missouri Supreme Court found that a jury trial was not nec-
essary because the underlying claim was equitable, even though the remedy
was traditionally legal.'35
Yet in Krummenacher,136 Burnett,137 and Jaycox,138 the Missouri Su-
preme Court reached the opposite result, finding that trial courts could not
order a jury trial if they had equitable jurisdiction. 139 The Leonardi majority
noted that those cases would have required two full trials to resolve the
claims, one trial before the court on the equitable claim, the other in front of a
jury for the legal claim. 140
Having considered the most recent Missouri precedent, the Leonardi
court attempted to reconcile those cases but found it "difficult, if not impossi-
ble."' 14 1 In Jaycox, Burnett, and Krummenacher, the courts held that a sepa-
rate trial was needed if equitable relief was not granted. 142 In contrast, in
Rockhill Tennis Club, Willman I, and Willman II, preserving an equitable
claim was not necessary when granting equitable relief.143 The quandary re-
maining, found the court, was "whether equitable 'jurisdiction' is 'estab-
lished' by facts pleaded, defenses asserted, relief requested, facts proved,
relief granted, or some ever changing combination of the above. ' 144 The court
resolved its own question, however, by concluding that the query was not
necessary because consideration of the historical preference for jury trials and
the consolidation of legal and equitable jurisdiction do not support such a
strong separation of legal and equitable causes. 145
The court then traced the development of a right to a jury trial from Eng-
lish common law, to the first Missouri constitution, and finally to current
133. State ex rel. Willman v. Sloan, 574 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1978) (en banc), abro-
gated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
134. See Willman 1, 499 S.W.2d at 778.
135. Willman 11, 574 S.W.2d at 423.
136. Krummenacher v. W. Auto Supply Co., 217 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1949) (en
banc), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
137. Burnett v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1961), abrogated by Leonardi, 137
S.W.3d 462.
138. Jaycox v. Brune, 434 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1968), abrogated by Leonardi, 137
S.W.3d 462.
139. Krummenacher, 217 S.W.2d at 475-76; Burnett, 349 S.W.2d at 24; Jaycox,
434 S.W.2d at 543.
140. State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462, 466-67 (Mo. 2004) (en
banc).
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Missouri principles and case law.146 The court then concluded that after
merger of law and equity, the idea of an equitable cleanup doctrine is not
necessary because the trial court can render any and all appropriate relief; it
does not matter if the remedy requested is equitable, such as a preliminary
injunction, or legal, such as monetary damages. 47 The only difficulties that
arise, found the court, are issues pertaining to the practical ramifications of
the relief sought, 48 because parties have a right to have legal issues tried
before a jury149 but are not entitled to a jury for equitable claims.' The court
recognized that Missouri cases have followed the equitable cleanup doctrine,
but it concluded that "[t]o allow the doctrine of equitable cleanup as a blanket
rule to supplant a litigant's ability otherwise to have a jury trial of his or her
claims at law demonstrates inadequate respect for [Missouri's preference for
jury trials]."'5'1
The Leonardi court found that within a single action in which multiple
remedies are sought, claims at law should be tried to a jury and the court
should, at its discretion, determine only equitable claims and defenses consis-
tent with the jury's factual findings.' 52 This is consistent with the federal
practice. 53 The court also held that for practicality and efficiency reasons,
incidental claims at law may be tried without a jury to the court if they are
connected to equitable claims.' 54 Although the federal courts do not allow any
litigant with claims at law, even if they are incidental, to be denied a right to
trial by jury for those claims,' 55 the Missouri Supreme Court held that allow-
ing incidental claims to be tried to the court is allowable only as an exception
to the general rule of jury trials for legal claims.'
56
According to the court, this procedure is beneficial in terms of flexibil-
ity, practicality, and efficiency.5 It also preserves the historical distinction
146. See id. at 465-73. For further discussion, see supra notes 48-55 and
accompanying text.
147. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 472.
148. Id.
149. Id. See also MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).
150. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 472. See also State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95
S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
151. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 473.
152. Id.
153. Id. E.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959)
("[T]he trial court will necessarily have to use its discretion in deciding whether the
legal or equitable cause should be tried first. Since the right to jury trial is a constitu-
tional one, however, while no similar requirement protects trials by the court, that
discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to pre-
serve jury trial.").
154. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 474.
155. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962).
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between claims at law and in equity without sacrificing the preference for
trial by jury.158 Finally, the procedure does not expand the right to trial byjury because equitable claims will remain in the domain of claims tried to the
court. 19 Trial courts have the discretion to resolve cases in the "most practi-
cal and efficient manner possible," but their decisions must be consistent withMissouri's preference for a jury trial for legal claims. 60 Therefore, "[u]nless
circumstances clearly demand otherwise," trial courts should reserve the legal
claims to jury trial with the remaining equitable claims to be tried before thebench.' 61 Applying these principles, the court held that the trial court should
not have denied Leonardi's request for a jury trial for its legal counterclaims
because the existence of an equitable claim does not justify a wholesale de-
nial of a request for a jury trial. 162
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Benton, joined by Judge Limbaugh, handed down a dissenting
opinion rejecting the majority's contention that Missouri case law did notpresent a clearly defined rule for separating those causes of action entitled to
a jury trial from those requiring a bench trial. 163 The dissent found that the
general rule is that equity will retain jurisdiction once acquired until completejustice is achieved. 64 The dissent asserted that the cases cited by the majority
were not "inconsistent and confusing."' 165 Instead, there is a general rule re-
quiring bench trials and the "fail of establishment" exception.' 66 The dissent
said that the "fail of establishment" exception exists when: 1) only relief atlaw is sought, or 2) plaintiff's equitable claims are unsuccessful or are dis-
missed. 1
67
The dissent found that all Missouri precedent adhered to the general rule
that once equity jurisdiction is invoked, the court retains jurisdiction and the
entire case should be court tried before the bench. 168 The reason Krummen-
acher, Burnett, and Jaycox required juries trials, the dissent found, was be-
cause they all fell within the "fail of establishment" exception. 169 On the other
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 473.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 474.
163. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 475 (Benton, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting). See State ex rel. Willman v. Sloan, 574 S.W.2d
421, 423 (Mo. 1978) (en banc), abrogated by Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d 462.
168. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 475 (Benton, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
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hand, in Rockhill Tennis Club, Willman I, and Willman II, the court found that
the "fail of establishment" exception did not apply so no jury was required.1
70
Although the majority suggests that the latter group of cases is not con-
sistent with the former, the dissent distinguished them based on the type of
claim.'7 1 This is different than the majority's approach because by concentrat-
ing on the claim, the type of relief does not matter.' 72 The dissent pointed out
that in Rockhill Tennis Club and Willman II, the only claims raised were equi-
table, but the court found that monetary damages, not usually a remedy avail-
able in equity, was appropriate in those situations.173 The dissent distin-
guished those cases because the claims were not converted into legal claims
by the awarding of damages; therefore, the court was justified in not granting
a request for a jury trial.' 74 In the other cases raised by the majority, both
legal and equitable claims were raised, requiring application of the "fail of
establishment" exception.175 Because the equitable claims were dismissed or
terminated adversely, a jury was required for the remaining legal claims.
76
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the dissent found that
Leonardi was not entitled to a jury trial.177 Because plaintiffs request for an
equitable remedy was not dismissed or terminated adversely, both legal and
equitable claims remained. 78 As a result, the dissent would have held that the
trial judge was correct to retain equitable jurisdiction over all the claims and
deny a jury trial. 17
9
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority was wrong to depart from
over one hundred years of precedent that was "fair and efficient."'
8 The dis-
sent focused on efficiency, stating that "(1) if the judge grants temporary re-
lief, full relief can follow promptly, or (2) if the judge denies all equitable
relief, legal claims still go to the jury."''8 The Missouri rule is better than the
rule followed by the federal courts, according to the dissent, because it is
more prompt and wastes less time and resources.' 82 Therefore, since the cur-
170. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting)
174. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting). Missouri's guarantee of a jury trial does not ap-
ply to claims seeking equitable relief. See State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d
82, 85 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
175. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 475 (Benton, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting). The trial court found that denial of a preliminary
injunction did not preclude plaintiff from being awarded a permanent injunction if the
facts supported it. Id. at 465.
179. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
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rent rule is highly efficient and is not inconsistent, there is no reason to aban-
don Missouri's settled rule. 1
83
V. COMMENT
The major premises cited by the majority in Leonardi are not without
merit, but the decision does not provide enough guidance for lower courts to
follow. The majority decision is beneficial to litigants and to the judicial sys-
tem in terms of historical preference for a jury trial, consistency with the fed-
eral standard, efficiency, and practicality. The Leonardi majority correctly
asserts that flexibility also recommends the abrogation of precedent, 84 but it
does so at the cost of a clear standard. Because Leonardi does not propose a
firm standard for lower courts to follow, it may need to be refined.
The right to a jury in a civil trial has ancient roots. 85 Once the American
government was established, it was quick to model its court system after the
English system.'86 Although the structure and procedures have changed, the
trial itself has remained largely untouched. 187 Regardless of the outcome,
determining the ability of trial courts to hear legal claims without guarantee-
ing a right to a jury trial through use of the equitable cleanup doctrine is a
question that touches the heart of American jurisprudence. 88
Because of a jury trial's historical roots, some procedures resulting from
combined law and equity courts have become antiquated and obsolete. 89 The
equitable cleanup doctrine evolved in old England to streamline actions and
prevent multiplicity of suits. ' 90 Although the doctrine had obvious advantages
when it was implemented, some of its advantages have been undermined by
the merger of law and equity courts. 19 1 Merger meant that claims of different
types could be brought in a single action, removing the procedural and juris-
183. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 474.
185. See Sward, supra note 2, at 353-56.
186. Id. at 348.
187. Id.
188. The right to trial by jury is so important that it is constitutionally protected in
nearly every state court system and in the federal court system. Note, supra note 33,
at 1176.
189. See Levin, supra note 64, at 320-26. For example, in the distant past a legal
claim would be dismissed if brought in an equity court. Id. at 322. In modem times,denial of equitable relief does not mandate dismissal of the suit. Id. Therefore, "the
practicalities have changed." Id.
190. Note, supra note 33, at 1181-82.
191. The equitable cleanup doctrine was created out of "necessity created by sepa-
rate court systems," making it more fair to bring both legal and equitable claims andpreventing the wastefulness that resulted by separate trials in separate courts. San-
chez, supra note 62, at 642.
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dictional distinctions between legal and equitable actions.'
92 Since merger of
the federal court system in 1938, the time and resources once saved by the
equitable cleanup doctrine became a matter of right, not 
doctrinal policy.' 93
Missouri also abolished the dichotomy of courts, vesting jurisdiction for
claims both in equity and at law within a single court.
194 As a result, in both
federal and Missouri courts, the necessity for use of the equitable cleanup
doctrine created by separate courts no longer exists.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the equitable
cleanup doctrine has become increasingly obsolete.'
95 Since 1959, the Court
has maneuvered away from allowing the equitable cleanup doctrine to pre-
clude jury trials on claims at law, no matter how incidental or insignificant
they may be as compared to the equitable claims brought 
by the parties.' 96
Although the Supreme Court has not totally abolished the equitable cleanup
doctrine, it has stated that its use should be very narrowly limited in deference
to the constitutional right to a jury trial for legal claims.1
97
With the Leonardi decision, the Missouri Supreme Court has taken a
similar stance. In doing so, the court abrogated numerous cases approving the
use of the equitable cleanup doctrine.' 9 Since "adherence to precedent should
be the rule and not the exception,"'9 9 the logic upon which the Leonardi court• • 200
departed from precedent must be strong and convincing.
In Leonardi, the court based its decision on inconsistency of prior case
law, the historical preference for a jury trial, and efficiency. 20' Although the
court's reasoning seems quite logical, it must satisfy a high burden to justify
departure from precedent. It is well established that both the United States
Constitution and the Missouri Constitution only guarantee a right to a jury
192. Id.
193. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
194. Mo. CONST. of 1820, amend. 1, 2 (abolishing the office of chancellor and
relegating equity jurisdiction to the supreme court and circuit courts).
195. Sanchez, supra note 62, at 644-48.
196. Id.
197. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959).
198. See State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Mo. 2004) (en
banc).
199. BENJAMIN N. CARDoZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921).
200. Judges are not irrevocably confined to past decisions. See id. at 150. Scholars
have identified five factors which should be considered when contemplating departure
from stare decisis: 1) whether the court is deciding a statutory or constitutional case,
2) whether the decision is inconsistent with justice, 3) whether there has been substan-
tial reliance on prior decisions, 4) whether the court was unanimous or not in making
the precedent, and 5) whether the age of the precedent has caused it to emerge as an
authoritative rule. Christopher P. Banks, Reversals of Precedent and Judicial Policy-
making: How Judicial Conceptions of Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court Influ-
ence Social Change, 32 AKRON L. REV. 233, 235-36 (1999).
201. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 465, 472.
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202trial as to claims brought before the courts at law. When the Leonardi
court, therefore, refers to the right to a jury trial as "fundamental," it only
does so insofar as it relates to a trial by jury for legal claims.2 °3 The equitable
cleanup doctrine, in essence, represents that the "fundamental" right to a jury
trial has not historically applied to those legal claims that have been classified
as incidental to an equitable claim.20 4 The equitable cleanup doctrine devel-
oped first in English common law. 20 5 Therefore it too has a historical basis.
The Leonardi court's use of historical basis -for the right to a jury trial is
therefore no more persuasive than the use of historical basis to recommend
the continued use of the equitable cleanup doctrine.
The court's other support for its departure from precedent, inconsistency
of application of the doctrine in prior cases, was attacked by the dissent.20 6
The dissenters argued that the cases consistently applied the rule with respect
to the claim brought, not the relief requested.20 7 Despite the potential merit to
the dissent's argument, 20 8 the risk of inconsistency in precedent is one which
deserves closer consideration. Adherence to precedent protects litigant inter-
ests including stability in the law, judicial economy, judicial legitimacy, reli-
ance on the law, and expeditious litigation. 20 9 If a court does not properly
adhere to previous decisions, inconsistent precedent will be created, risking
the protection of litigant interests. 210 However, blind adherence to precedent
is not always in the interests of justice.2 11 When appropriate, the court should
be willing to overrule precedent:
Necessity reaches this outer limit when the policy considerations
undergirding adherence either weigh in favor of, or are not impli-
cated by, the limiting or overruling of precedent. Reliance interests
are least impacted when an old rule is replaced by one that com-
ports with current modes of behavior. Nor is judicial expedition
threatened by a new rule that enhances judicial efficiency. More-
over, both the image of judicial legitimacy and the ethic of equal
treatment are less affected by adoption of a rule that promotes
202. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 34, § 8.1 (noting that the right to a jury trial ispreserved at least insofar as it existed in English history or at the time the 7th
Amendment was adopted).
203. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 472.
204. Note, supra note 33, at 1181-82.
205. Sward, supra note 2, at 360.
206. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 474 (Benton, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 475 (Benton, J., dissenting).
208. Examining the factual intricacies is beyond the scope of this Note.209. Paul W. Werner, Comment, The Straits of Stare Decisis and the Utah Court
of Appeals: Navigating the Scylla of Under-application and the Charybdis of Over-
Application, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 634.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 650.
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equality of treatment than they are by adherence to a rule that is
unprincipled in its reasoning and application.
212
Thus it is often difficult to justify abrogation, but there are times when a
change in the law is not only good policy but also the proper course of action.
Bearing in mind the weight afforded to precedent and the considerations that
should be taken into account to overrule it, it is useful to look beyond the
factual inconsistencies of prior Missouri law. Even assuming that the dissent
is correct in its reasoning regarding the distinction between claims brought
and relief sought, it wholly ignores the remaining reasoning 
of the court.2 13
The policies behind the right to a jury trial support erring on the side of
caution when depriving a litigant of a jury trial. In the federal courts, not only
does the Seventh Amendment protect the right to a jury trial, it has been
found that maintaining the right is of "such historical importance that the
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care." 2 14 "The importance of a fair jury trial has [also] been recognized by
Missouri courts.",2t 5 Therefore some deference must be given to the policy
considerations behind the right to a jury trial.
As noted previously, justifying abrogation is easier if an old rule is re-
placed by a new rule that comports with current behavioral modes, thereby
not harming litigants' reliance interests. 216 Leonardi's practice of severely
limiting the equitable cleanup doctrine comports with 
the federal practice.-
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the reasons for allowing
legal claims to be tried without a jury needed to be re-evaluated because the
Federal Rules allowed for liberal joinder of claims, so all causes could be
resolved in one civil action.21 8 The other basis for not allowing the use of the
equitable cleanup doctrine was a result of the Rules, citing that the "'right of
trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution...
shall be preserved . . . inviolate."' 219 Because Missouri and the federal gov-
212. Id. (footnotes omitted).
213. The dissent carefully distinguishes the type of claims brought, but neglects to
comment on any of the remaining issues at hand including efficiency, historical fight
to a jury trial, or the argument that the equitable cleanup doctrine is not necessary
post-merger. See State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462, 474-75 (Mo.
2004) (en banc) (Benton, J., dissenting).
214. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 737 (2004) (citing generally Curry v.
Pyramid Life Ins. Co, 271 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1959)).
215. W. Dudley McCarter, The Right to a Fair Jury Trial-Not a Perfect One, 53
J. Mo. B. 170, 176 (1997) (citing Speck v. Abell-Howe Co., 839 S.W.2d 623, 626
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992)).
216. Werner, supra note 209, at 650.
217. Sanchez, supra note 62, at 644-48. The federal courts began developing this
rule in 1959 beginning with Beacon Theatres, Inc. Id. at 644.
218. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
219. Id. at 510 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a)).
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emiment provide similar rights to jury trials and both have merged the courts
of law and equity, the reasons for limiting equitable cleanup in the federal
courts should be equally persuasive for Missouri courts. Additionally, re-
stricting the use of the equitable cleanup doctrine does not deprive any party
of substantive rights; it merely lessens the possibility that legal claims will be
heard by the court instead of the jury if the parties so desire.
Finally, if the new rule enhances judicial efficiency, disregarding prior
Missouri law is more likely to be justified. The dissent and the majority
sharply disagreed as to the efficiency of the equitable cleanup doctrine.2 2°
Although no advantage would be gained if equitable claims were tried simul-
taneously as unrelated legal claims, 22 there may be some advantage in allow-
ing use of the cleanup doctrine for claims that are intimately related.222 Nev-
ertheless, the advantages are not necessarily exclusive to use of the doc-
trine. 223 Even though use of the equitable cleanup doctrine can result in sub-
stantial economies, it is not successful in eliminating all costs, and sometimes
it even elevates them.224 As a result, the dissent's claims of efficiency result-
ing from use of the equitable cleanup doctrine are not overly persuasive. The
procedures adopted by the majority could offer a more efficient solution by
precluding the need for a second trial if equitable relief is denied. If practical-
ity and efficiency demand it, the Leonardi majority allowed for a narrow
group of cases to be heard by the court without a jury.225 However, the major-
ity was not crystal clear as to which cases fall within that narrow group.
"Unless circumstances clearly demand otherwise" is not a standard which
produces clear results. The court found that a jury trial should be preserved
"whenever possible," 226 which suggests a strong preference for allowing legal
claims to be tried by a jury. Nevertheless, the court did not set up a clear test
for lower courts to follow. Instead the Missouri Supreme Court left applica-
tion issues of its decision to the trial courts' "discretion. 227
220. Compare State ex rel Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Mo. 2004)(en banc) with id. at 475 (Benton, J., dissenting).
221. Levin, supra note 64, at 323.
222. Id. at 323-24. For example, if claimant requests specific performance anddamages and the court denies equitable relief and is not willing or able to award equi-
table damages, a further jury trial would be necessary for the legal question of dam-
ages. Id. at 324. Common evidence would be heard twice, thus creating inefficiency if
the cleanup doctrine does not allow the court to award damages using its equitablejurisdiction. Id.
223. This situation could be remedied without use of the equitable cleanup doc-
trine, if the court would empanel a jury to hear the trial from the beginning. Id.
224. There is a certain procedural cost in impaneling a jury after equitable relief isdenied. Id. The overcrowding of dockets and additional attorneys' fees create large
time and money costs for the litigants. See id.
225. Leonardi, 137 S.W.3d at 474.
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CONCLUSION
The majority in State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry228 held that abrogation
of hundreds of years of precedent was necessary in order to establish a more
efficient and flexible rule consistent with Missouri's historical preference for
a jury trial. 229 Although the reasons the majority provided may not precisely
fit their purpose, the conclusion that the existence of an equitable claim
should not necessarily deprive a litigant of a jury trial has merit and is consis-
tent with the federal practice. Unfortunately, the court allows for trial court
discretion but only provides the unclear standard of "[u]nless circumstances
clearly demand otherwise." 230 Such a standard gives little guidance to lower
courts. The court did, however, suggest a strong preference that claims at law
be tried by juries. 231 Such a preference indicates that a lower court is encour-
aged, in all but a very few occasions, 232 to allow legal claims to be tried to a
jury and to reserve to the court only those claims that are almost entirely equi-
table.
TABITHA G. DAVISSON
228. 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
229. Id. at 473-74.
230. Id. at 473.
231. Id.
232. The court does not suggest any occasions that a case may qualify for bench
trial alone, but seems to be likely to follow the lead of the federal courts. See id.
[Vol. 70
22
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